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The Role of the European Union in the Normalisation of the  
Georgia-Russia Relationship: Promises and Impediments 
 
Georgia’s inclusion in the European Neighbourhood Policy has 
enhanced the importance of the European Union in the context of 
the country’s development objectives. Concurrently, an 
exaggerated ability of EU resources to work for Georgia have 
raised expectations that will be difficult to meet. Assistance in the 
normalisation of Georgia-Russia relations is one such issue. This 
paper aims at bringing a greater clarification of the EU’s potential 
as a mediator. For this purpose, the root causes of the problems in 
Georgia-Russia relations and the characteristics of Russian policy 
will be considered along with an assessment of the EU’s potential 
for mediation.  
 
Russian Policy towards Georgia:  Goals and Motivation 
 
Historical Aspect. The relationship between Georgia and Russia 
has always been problematic with bilateral relations in the wake of 
restoring national independence often reaching a critical and, 
therefore, dangerous phase for the security and stability of the 
Georgian state.  Naturally, there were periods of détente but this 
had a temporary or even false character. Throughout its history, 
Georgia has always declared and genuinely aspired towards good 
neighbourly and equal partnerships with Russia. Regrettably, these 
principles of building relationships appeared to be unacceptable for 
Russia and remain so even today.  Georgia, which has been 
seeking to build amicable relations with neighbouring or distant 
nations, was successful everywhere except with Russia. In fact, 
Russia has always been—and remains to be—the only country in 
the world with which Georgia has more serious unsettled problems 
than mutually beneficial agreements. 
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Russia’s unacceptance of Georgia’s independence is the reason for 
the plethora of acute problems in the Georgia-Russia bilateral 
relations of the 1990s. The tense relations came, first of all, from 
Russia’s desire to be both a Big Brother for Georgia and, at the 
same time, to punish it as well. The motivation for such a 
punishment emerged immediately upon the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union when Russia regarded Georgia as an unreliable and 
disloyal country. Such an attitude in its turn was formed on the 
basis of the belief that the national movement in Georgia was the 
first and primary catalyst of the centrifugal processes in the Soviet 
Union, on one hand, and that Georgia’s leader―in then president 
Eduard Shevardnadze, who played a decisive role in the break-up 
of the Soviet Empire―was both dangerous and untrustworthy for 
Russia’s interests, on the other.  The collapse of the Soviet Empire 
appeared to be the most unacceptable fact for the new political 
elite in Russia.  Even today, many amongst them are unable to 
hide their feelings of nostalgia for the lost might of Russia.  
 
By the beginning of the new century, Georgia had clearly drawn up 
its new foreign policy priorities wherein the nation’s basic course of 
development was directed towards the country’s integration into 
Western military-political and economic structures.  This period 
coincided with the coming to power of Vladimir Putin. In its turn, 
Russia’s foreign policy became more streamlined and focused. This 
intended to preserve and further enhance Russia’s influence over 
the entire post-Soviet space including, and especially, in the 
Caucasus. By default, this was an impediment for Georgia’s 
becoming integrated into the Euro-Atlantic space. The conflict of 
interests reached its apogee after a new government came to 
power in Georgia when President Saakashvili’s foreign policy 
became more “aggressive” and the country began to take fast 
steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration. A former single irritant in 
Georgia-Russia relations was now doubled. In other words, 
 27
punishing Georgia was now augmented by an added motivation to 
hinder the country’s democratic development and its accession to 
NATO. This notwithstanding, Georgian authorities continued to 
advance along their chosen course whilst in parallel attempting to 
lessen the “Russia factor” through the carrying out of a principled 
policy. One of the most remarkable outcomes of such a policy was 
Russia’s forced agreement to withdraw its military bases from 
Georgia.  In response, Russia at first banned the import of 
Georgian citrus and other garden crops and then began to banish 
Georgian wines and mineral waters from the Russian market on 
various pretexts. The Georgian side, not wanting to lose the 
initiative, started to discredit Russia’s conflict mediation role 
followed by the demand for the modification of the formats of both 
conflict resolution talks and peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia 
and the Tskhinvali Region.1 Tensions between the two countries 
culminated after August and September 2006 initially when, as a 
result of the successful police operation in the Kodori Gorge, the 
jurisdiction of the central authorities was re-established followed 
by the placement therein of the Government-in-exile of Abkhazia. 
Adding to the problem was the detention of four Russian officers 
for espionage charges. They were soon publicly passed over to the 
OSCE Representative, who had arrived in Tbilisi specifically for this 
purpose, in a manner which was a humiliation for Russia. In 
response, Russia immediately recalled its ambassador and 
terminated transportation and postal communication with Georgia. 
Concurrently, Russia began to expel Georgian citizens and forcibly 
squeeze out Georgian businesses. These sanctions, in fact, took 
the form of a blockade with Georgia-Russia relations subsequently 
becoming extremely cold and reaching an unprecedented low 
                                                 
1 The term Tskhinvali Region refers to South Ossetia, a former autonomous region of Soviet 
Georgia.  Following the declaration of independence of Georgia, the autonomy of South Ossetia was 
abolished.  Now, the status of this territory is the major problem within the existing conflict.  
Independent Georgia does not recognise South Ossetia as a distinct or independent entity, instead 
referring to the region by either its historic medieval name of Samachablo or, more recently, 
Tskhinvali Region (after the province's capital).  
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point. Although the Russian ambassador was returned to Georgia 
at the end of January 2007—a move which some have interpreted 
to be the start of a normalisation process—the relations between 
Georgia and Russia still remain in crisis. 
 
Psychological Aspect. The current problems in Georgia-Russia 
relations can also be explained by an emotional or psychological 
aspect which, to a certain extent, is related to the fear of “losing 
Georgia” in the consciousness of Russian society.  In particular, a 
two-hundred year history of co-existence wherein Georgia and 
Georgians played an important role in the process of shaping 
Russian imperial statehood and the intellectual culture of Russia 
resulted in an impression or belief within the collective Russian 
mentality that Georgians were “ours.” The Soviet era is of special 
note because Georgia’s resort and recreational attractiveness 
became apparent amongst Russians. At the same time, Georgian 
hospitality and the psycho-emotional comfort of Russians in 
interpersonal relations with Georgians made Russian society 
interpret “anything Georgian,” as it were, as an inseparable part of 
their own (Soviet) identity. For decades, even the symbols of such 
intimacy were born with Gagra, “Borjomi,” “Khvanchkara” or 
“Suliko” as only a few examples. There are many more similar 
symbols and there exists an erroneous sense that all of these will 
disappear after “losing” Georgia. In addition to the 
aforementioned, a certain disappointment exists as well. It is 
believed in Russia that for tens of years Georgia used Soviet 
subsidies and continued to receive inexpensive Russian gas during 
the years of independence. There were also times when Russia 
backed up the Georgian government in some of its most critical 
situations.  Against this backdrop, it is regarded that Georgia is 
ungrateful and “is running away towards others.” 
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Geopolitical Aspect. A comprehensive analysis of Georgia-
Russian Relations also requires that these relations be considered 
within a global context. From the outset, it should be noted that 
the relationship with Georgia is a part of Russia’s wider strategy 
elaborated during the presidency of Vladimir Putin which aims at 
three main goals: a) retain the territorial integrity of the country 
within current borders, b) undergo economic and technological 
modernisation and c) restore the status of a world power for 
Russia. The foreign policy-related prerequisites of achieving these 
goals have been specified as follows:  the preservation of a sole 
leadership and the reinforcement of its influence over the post-
Soviet territory, an increase of Europe’s dependence on Russia and 
a diminishing of US hegemony. In this context, Russia’s 
political elite perceives a “deterrence” of Georgia’s strive 
towards democratic transformation and integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic space as a task of vital importance.2  In other 
words, it is inadmissible that Georgia falls out of the mentioned 
strategy. Otherwise, it is supposed that a democratic and Western-
integrated country of Georgia will become a model for others.  
Additionally, the temptation of the US and NATO to turn Georgia 
into their military base will emerge. In this situation, a number of 
results may occur: 
- The separatist movement will intensify in the North Caucasus 
compromising the territorial integrity of Russia. 
- A precedent of providing conditions for swift development 
under Western security guarantees will arise in the CIS space, 
including the South Caucasus, which will further shake 
Russia’s already shaken authority and influence. 
                                                 
2 According to the statement of Russian Defense Minister, Sergey Ivanov, made at the Security 
Conference in Munich on 10 February 2007, Georgia’s joining NATO is not dangerous for his country.  
The credibility of this statement raises doubt as it is in conflict with the position of the Russian 
Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, who had earlier stated that Georgia’s membership in NATO was 
unacceptable for Russia’s interests.  
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- The strengthening of Georgia-US security co-operation and 
military political ties and Georgia’s accession to NATO will 
further enhance US influence in the South Caucasus which 
might proliferate over other regions of the CIS and Eurasia. 
- US military bases and NATO anti-missile systems may be 
deployed in Georgia as it is likely to happen in some Eastern 
European countries.3  
- The transit attractiveness of Georgia and the whole of the 
South Caucasus will be increased in regards to transportation 
of Caspian energy to Western markets thereby to a certain 
extent lessening Europe’s energy dependence on Russia. 
Such a threat perception renders impossible Russia’s acceptance of 
Georgia’s course of development. This kind of conflict of interest is 
the ground for constant confrontation between the two countries 
hindering the normalisation of relations. 
 
“The Putin Factor.” Vladimir Putin, who obviously makes every 
effort to gain an honourable place in the history of modern Russia, 
will try his best to exclude “a serious failure in the Georgian issue” 
for the period of his presidency. Allowing the settlement of conflicts 
in Georgia at the expense of the interests of the loyal-to-Russia 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists and, most importantly, 
opening the way for Georgia towards integration in the Euro-
Atlantic space would be taken as just that kind of “failure” by the 
ruling elite of Russia and its wider public. Making problems for 
Georgia in the aforementioned issues, therefore, can also be 
explained by the personal political agenda of Vladimir Putin. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The denunciation of the deployment of a number of US military contingents and NATO arms in 
Eastern Europe was the principal thesis of President Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference.    
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Methods and Instruments of Russian Policy 
 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a 
deep geopolitical knock-down with almost a whole decade required 
for it to come to its senses and rise to its feet. Within conditions of 
economic chaos and an ideological vacuum, Russia totally lost a 
guiding line of development. However strange as it may sound 
today, there was a time when Russia’s joining the “Common 
European House” and entering NATO was discussed. Naturally, this 
kind of integration should happen on the basis of Western values 
and the Western rules of the game. The only issue that Russia, as 
a successor of the old Empire, could instinctively realise was the 
need to maintain its influence over the former Soviet republics. 
This was how the idea of a newly fabricated “integration” came into 
being that later turned into the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). The mere idea of a CIS, however, did not prove 
enough for some “disobedient” neighbours as Georgia which was 
considered to be the most insubordinate. It was necessary to use a 
coercive approach by putting a country into an economic 
blockade and encouraging centrifugal trends in its 
peripheral regions. These methods were immediately used 
against Georgia and, in part, against some other republics. In the 
meantime, the “velikoderzhavny” or Great Power spirit came to 
prevail and the vector of relation and integration with the West 
changed direction. The main emphasis was placed on the 
consolidation of its grip on the CIS space. Soon, Russia ceased 
using economic sanctions and blockades as a political tool since it 
came to be understood that this could discredit the idea of the 
CIS.4 Instead, the emphasis was made on supporting separatist 
movements. In the process of confrontation between central 
authorities and separatists, Russia sided with the latter both 
                                                 
4 Russia, however, has not thrown this tool of influence out of its arsenal as was clearly 
demonstrated by the sanctions imposed against Georgia in 2006 and also the recent developments of 
Russia’s relationship with some other former Soviet republics.   
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covertly and openly.  This brought the conflict zones in Georgia, 
Moldova and Azerbaijan to de facto independence. Subsequently, 
Russia managed to secure a leading role in the process of conflict 
resolution which it has artfully used to “freeze” the process to date. 
It should be noted that manipulation by “frozen conflicts” has 
proved to be a rather effective instrument for hindering the 
democratic development of Moldova and the South Caucasus 
states including Georgia. This method also proved “successful” in 
impeding the process of the rapprochement of these countries to 
Western institutions. Indeed, if anything could hinder Georgia’s 
ultimate integration in NATO or otherwise complicate this process it 
would be the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali 
Region.  
 
Russian military bases and the related infrastructure in 
Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, as well as peacekeeping 
contingents in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, are used as 
effective instruments to influence political processes first and 
foremost by “freezing” the conflicts.  In the case of Georgia, the 
military bases have already lost this function as they are now 
being withdrawn.5 The military bases in Moldova and Armenia 
continue to retain a political role.  On the other hand, Russia tries 
its best to keep the format of current peacekeeping operations in 
Georgia unchanged where it plays the exclusive and or leading 
role. Russia considers this decisive for keeping the conflict 
resolution process “frozen.”    
 
The control over energy production and consumer markets and, as 
a result, strengthening its position as an energy Super Power is 
one of the most important duties of Russian foreign policy.  To this 
end, Russia is looking to gain complete or significant control 
                                                 
5 The real status of the base deployed in Gudauta (Abkhazia) is unknown.  It was to be closed down 
in 2001 according to the agreement reached within the framework of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul 
Summit.  To date, this has been impossible to verify.      
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over energy facilities (generation, distribution and transit) 
in both energy producing countries, energy distribution and transit 
states. This refers mostly to Europe and the post-Soviet territory.  
In the future, however, Russia plans to conquer the markets of 
India, China, other countries of the Far East and North America.  
State controlled companies or those under the patronage of the 
state are used to implement this policy with energy giant Gazprom 
in the forefront. The debt-for-assets method is Russia’s main tool 
for getting hold of energy facilities in post-Soviet countries. Of late, 
Russia has been claiming energy assets in exchange for 
inexpensive natural gas. Armenia, unfortunately, is a classic 
example where the whole energy sector, in one form or another, is 
in the hands of Russian state capital and where the taking over of 
the transportation and mining industries is only a matter of time. 
In Georgia, the aforementioned policy is carried out by Gazprom’s 
close associate, Itera, which, in fact, handles the controlling shares 
of the regional gas distribution companies. Energy companies such 
as Telasi, Energy Invest (including the chemical manufacturer 
Azoti) and the ninth and tenth power[-generating] units of Tbilsresi 
(a Tbilisi thermal power plant) are also dependent on Russian state 
capital. It should be noted that the interests of Russian capital in 
Georgia are not only limited to the energy sector but also banking, 
winemaking and telecommunications. 
 
Ideological support to the Russian policy appeared on the 
agenda from the early 1990s. It was the so-called neo-Eurasianists 
who made the first attempt to establish a theoretical foundation for 
the consolidation of influence in the CIS space.  They believed that 
a rejection of Atlanticism,6 the strategic control of the US and 
thwarting Western liberal values was the mission of Russia. 
Afterwards, the Russian version of the concept of a “liberal empire” 
                                                 
6 Atlanticism is a doctrine of co-operation amongst Western European and North American nations 
regarding political, economic and defense issues. 
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emerged. This was based upon a more modernised model of 
Eurasian integration and was more pragmatic and specific in 
character. The core of the concept was an economic and political 
expansion of Russia that appeared, upon first glance, to be based 
on modern universal liberal values. In other words, the doctrine of 
a “liberal empire” was the attempt to conceal Russia’s expansionist 
plans under the cover of liberal values.7 According to one of the 
arguments of the doctrine, Russia’s territorial integrity and 
resources could not be preserved without its economic and political 
expansion. Herein it must be noted that the emphasis on an 
economic expansion is not incidental. Whereas the previous 
doctrine was designed by academics, the authors of the “liberal 
empire” are from the Russian oligarchy. Today, everyone can see 
that the economic expansion of Russia is a reality and the specific 
provisions of the “liberal empire” have been at work. At the same 
time, a new attempt of revising the ideological basics of the 
Russian policy can also be observed with this process going on in 
the presidential administration. The new political ideology is still to 
be shaped even though its doctrinal part has already been more or 
less identified.8 This is a concept of a so-called “sovereign 
democracy” within which the adjustment of democracy to the 
characteristics, historical experience and development priorities of 
Russia is the core.9 The building of this sort of adapted democracy 
is a sovereign right of Russia within which neither the West nor 
anyone else should interfere. Although the new political ideology, 
like the “liberal empire,” calls for the expansion of the economic 
and political influence over the neighbouring area, it is still an 
“innovative” one.  For the first time since the disintegration of the 
                                                 
7 V. Papava and F. Starr, “Russia’s Economic Imperialism,” Project Syndicate, January 2006 
(http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/papava1) 
8 See, for example, Vladislav Surkov, “Sovereignty is a Political Synonym of Competitiveness,” 
Moscow News, No 7-8, 2006  
9 For an insightful overview of ‘sovereign democracy,’ see Nicu Popescu, “Russia’s Soft Power 
Ambitions,” CEPS Policy Brief, No. 115, October 2006.  The discussion on the ideological support of 
Russia’s foreign policy follows this work to a great extent. 
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Soviet Union, Russia is aspiring towards exporting its own values 
and it is attempting to do so by way of a universalisation of its own 
“unique” democratic model. The tactical goal aims at establishing 
an effective network of ideas, institutions and the media to be able 
to “promptly disclose the weaknesses of modern ‘orange’ regimes 
and to restore Russia’s influence at both the governmental and 
public levels.”10  
 
Russia is not sparing funds for the development of a NGO 
infrastructure throughout CIS countries with pro-Russian and 
Russia-financed think tanks mushrooming. These organisations in 
Ukraine are developing the idea of a “sovereign Ukraine” according 
to which “Ukraine should not give away its national sovereignty to 
the European bureaucracy.”11 The “Free Europe-Moldova 
Foundation” has been established in Moldova with its pro-Russian 
orientation evident to everyone.12 Additionally, a CIS election 
monitoring organisation carries on its “business” in Russia wherein 
its assessments as a rule differ radically from OSCE observations. 
As for the South Caucasus, a so-called Development Foundation 
“Caucasus Institute for Democracy” (Фонд развития «Кавказкий 
институт демократии») is in operation within all three countries of 
the South Caucasus which frequently organises roundtables, public 
surveys and cultural events.  It regularly produces publications and 
implements media projects such as the recent opening of a radio 
station, Aizald-FM, broadcasting to the Tskhinvali Region and the 
founding of Gudok-Abkhazia (Гудок-Абхазия), a newspaper that is 
circulated in Abkhazia.13  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ivan Krastev, “Russia’s Post-Orange Empire,” opendemocracy.net, 20 October 2005. 
11 See interview with Modest Kolerov, http:/kreml.org/interview/60835783 
12 Nicu Popescu, op. cit. 
13 See more details at www.caucasusid.com  
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EU Interests in Georgia 
 
Until recently EU-Georgia relations have been that of donor and 
recipient. Between 1992 and 2004, the EU provided assistance to 
Georgia amounting to €450 million. In this period, a number of 
technical, humanitarian assistance and food security projects were 
implemented including rehabilitation programmes in the conflict 
zones. After Georgia had been invited to participate in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the relations acquired the 
character of a formalised partnership. The new relations, however, 
aim at the modernisation of the Georgian state so as to maximally 
approximate the political, legal and administration systems to 
European standards.  Unlike the integration project that Russia 
“offers” to the CIS countries, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy―and Euro-integration in general―is a voluntary process and 
is entirely based on the attractiveness of the EU.  
 
Georgia’s invitation to take part in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy was not accidental. The Rose Revolution intensified the 
interest not only towards Georgia but to the whole of the region 
although Georgia, therein, stands out. This attention is determined 
by Georgia’s increasing importance for Europe. One of the well-
argumented analyses of these interests has been offered by Dov 
Lynch14  as follows: 
 
(a) The Rose Revolution sparked the legitimate hope for 
Georgia’s successful democratic transition. A similar feeling 
had already existed in the wake of the Cold War in the post-
Soviet space but was short-lived. Following the change in 
government, certain successful steps made by the new 
authorities—the improvement of a budget discipline, the 
                                                 
14  Dov Lynch, ‘Why Georgia Matters,’ Chaillot Paper, No. 86, February 2006, pp. 66-8. 
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peaceful resolution of the Ajarian crisis and a significant 
reduction in corruption, amongst others—provided a new logic 
for the country’s development which in turn stimulated the 
interest of Western partners, including Europe, in fulfilling the 
abovementioned hope. 
(b) With Bulgaria and Romania’s entry into the EU, Georgia 
became Europe’s direct neighbour. The geographic proximity, 
apart from providing new opportunities for co-operation, has 
also created a desire in the EU to see Georgia institutionally 
strong enough to avoid becoming a transit corridor for threats 
directed towards Europe. First of all, this refers to the spread 
of organised crime, drug transit and illegal migration. The 
recent widely publicised case of the smuggling of enriched 
uranium further intensified the aforesaid will.  
(c) After Europe acknowledged the current or potential 
challenges of energy security, it became more focused on the 
task of finding alternative sources. In this context, Caspian 
hydrocarbons and Georgia as a potential transit country for 
the transportation of these resources to Europe have received 
growing interest. This interest became especially stronger 
after the completion of the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil and the South Caucasus gas (Shah-Deniz) 
pipelines.  
(d) Further keeping the conflicts in Abkhazia and the 
Tskhinvali Region unresolved may cause a new escalation of 
the tension. The EU is interested in the settlement of these 
conflicts as the region will otherwise be turned into an arena 
of blockades and confrontation with the possibility of a new 
war spreading over the Black Sea region and directly or 
indirectly endangering the security of the EU member or 
candidate countries.  
(e) Georgia is like a laboratory where one can monitor the 
tendencies existing all over the post-Soviet space, test the 
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strength of trans-Atlantic links and examine EU-Russia 
relations. Many processes and trends important for Europe 
are uncovered or initiated in various forms here. Europe, 
therefore, is becoming increasingly interested in securing 
peace in Georgia and the successful completion of its 
democratic transformation project. 
 
Despite the aforementioned, it is necessary to note that the extent 
of the EU’s involvement in the ongoing processes in Georgia and 
the whole region does not correspond to the level of its interests. 
The TRACECA programme is a good example of this. A 
programme, once started with great pomposity, completed only 
very few investment projects within its framework with a total cost 
of just several tens of millions of euros.  By way of comparison, 
600 million dollars have been spent for the construction of the 
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. The main challenge of the EU today in our 
region, therefore, is to become more active and to show itself 
adequately as regards its aforementioned interests whilst engaging 
in the foregoing processes. 
 
The EU’s Mediatorial Potential: Resources and   
Constraints 
                                                      
The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan, as a bilateral 
mandatory document assigning certain responsibilities to Georgia 
and the EU, is, at the same time, a new political basis for the EU to 
become more active. This document clearly states that the EU 
must facilitate the improvement of Georgia-Russia relations. Four 
areas have been identified in particular: the adoption and 
implementation of a bilateral treaty, co-operation on the resolution 
of conflicts, border delimitation and co-operation in border 
management and the promotion of stable economic co-operation.15 
                                                 
15 EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan, Paragraph 4.1.3,  
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As regards conflict resolution, the document additionally points out 
that this issue must be included within the agenda of a EU-Russia 
bilateral dialogue. The question arises:  What are the EU’s 
resources and constraints for it to be able to convince Russia of the 
necessity towards a normalisation of relations with Georgia? Herein 
we should clarify that the normalisation of Georgia-Russia relations 
includes at minimum a three-level task: 1. a discharge of the 
current critical phase and a return to the state of affairs of 
spring─summer 2006, 2.  Russia’s acceptance of Georgia’s course 
towards integration in the Euro-Atlantic space and its real support 
of conflict resolution in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region and 3. 
the establishment of a good neighbour and partnership relationship 
and the signing and ratification of a bilateral treaty. 
 
In this case, the EU’s political clout as a broker and its reputation 
of a relatively unbiased mediator are the main and, apparently, the 
sole resources in possession of the EU. Indeed, unlike the US, 
NATO and even the OSCE, the EU is looked upon more or less 
favourably in Russia. Certainly, everything is relative and the EU 
has not gained an absolute trust in Russia either. Europe’s growing 
energy dependence on Russian gas, however, and the 
inadequately light political weight of Europe itself within the 
international arena, makes the EU a convenient and a most 
acceptable partner for Russia. Herein we have to note that this 
“convenience” of a partner for Russia means listening to, in the 
best case, but rarely following advice.  Interestingly, in the short-
term Russia does not consider the EU as a competitor in the post-
Soviet space including Georgia. This is the result of the 
incorporation of a large group of East European countries into the 
EU in 2004 with the Union showing a clear sign of enlargement 
fatigue and having no intention of expansion into the Soviet space 
in the foreseeable future. We should also take into consideration 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.eu-integration.gov.ge/pdfs/ENP_AP_FINAL-2.pdf 
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the fact that Europe’s interest in energy resources is increasing in 
Russia’s competitor region of the Caspian Sea—in gas, in 
particular—but it has not thus far been clearly marked out. It is 
also notable that the EU agrees to play a secondary role in the 
conflict resolution process in the South Caucasus and is reluctant 
to offer any initiatives towards changing the Russia dominated 
formats.16 The “European threat” for Russia is more real in the 
long-term. Within the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, the participant countries, including Georgia, will reach a 
qualitatively new level of development as a result of jointly 
implemented Action Plans and the subsequent advanced formats of 
co-operation.  Consequently, political, legal and administrative 
systems alien to Russia will develop in the major part of the post-
Soviet area creating a favourable ground for the consolidation of 
Western interests and influence. From this point of view, Russia 
and the EU are competitors in the post-Soviet space. This is the 
very reason why the EU does not have the full trust of Russia. 
 
Additionally, there are other factors that limit the potential of the 
EU’s influence on Russia; namely: 
 
a) The main weakness of the EU relates to the multiplicity of 
perceptions of the outside world. A “mosaic-like approach” is 
particularly revealed in relation to the post-Soviet space. This 
is equally true in regards to Russia and other CIS regions or 
specific countries. This refers to the fact that, let us say, 
Lithuania and Portugal possess a different knowledge and 
motivation when the EU is making any decision regarding 
Georgia-related issues. When there is no common or shared 
                                                 
16 Of late the EU shows an increasing interest in resolving the conflicts in Georgia.  Notably, a new 
15-point plan for speeding up conflict resolution in Georgia, as yet undisclosed to the public, is being 
discussed in Brussels.  This plan is based on a comprehensive report prepared by the EUSR in 
tandem with the European Commission. For further details see   
http://euobserver.com/9/23744/?print=1. 
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vision, it is impossible to draw out a target-oriented policy 
and design its effective implementation strategy. This is the 
very reason why EU policy is frequently more impulsive, 
inconsistent and event-driven rather than one which is based 
on a well thought-out strategy.  
b) The abovementioned interests of the EU towards Georgia are 
not existential.  Georgia is not Serbia nor is the South 
Caucasus the Western Balkans. The current developments in 
the region, although important, are not placed amongst the 
EU’s highest priorities. The EU’s priority list today certainly 
contains energy security, Iran and Kosovo with the South 
Caucasus and Georgia only following. 
c) The EU is in a certain internal political crisis.  The 
enlargement fatigue and the “failure” of the French and Dutch 
referenda diminish the resources for carrying out a consistent 
foreign policy. Additionally, the rules and procedures of the 
EU itself do not allow the implementation of an expedient and 
active policy similar to that of the US including from the 
standpoint of the mobilisation of financial resources.17 
Moreover, because of the absence of the mentioned common 
vision within Europe, a decision-making process upon the 
elaboration of assistance programmes towards a specific 
region or country is quite competitive: some lobby the South 
Caucasus, some lobby the Mediterranean Region and others 
focus on the Middle East and so on. 
d) The primary hindrance is the “Russia factor” itself since the 
EU has many of the aforementioned priority issues to settle 
with Moscow. One of these is particularly topical and gaining 
vital importance in the course of a long-term prospective:  
this is the issue of securing a stable energy supply from 
Russia.  Because of this, the EU is limited in “disbursing” 
significant diplomatic and political resources for the issues 
                                                 
17 Dov Lynch,, op.cit, p. 72 
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related to Georgia. In addition, if the EU starts to be actively 
involved in the process of conflict resolution, including 
towards the modification of current formats, an issue on 
which Georgia eagerly insists, Russia will become annoyed 
and the EU’s resource of a “mediator” will shrink significantly. 
Furthermore, as the presidential elections in Russia approach, 
the “Georgian question” will gain more weight. It is expected 
that the political situation for a radical normalisation of 
Georgia-Russia relations may not be favourable during the 
electoral rally and Russia may turn a deaf ear to the European 
messages.  
 
Based on the aforementioned, it is assumed that it will be a 
difficult task for the EU alone to persuade Russia towards a 
complete normalisation of relations with Georgia.  For this, the EU 
possesses neither enough will nor the political resources. This does 
not mean, however, that the EU is unable to assist in improving 
these relations.  Moreover, in the case of co-ordinated actions with 
the US and other international players, it is not excluded that 
Russia would “yield” in favour of the territorial integrity of Georgia 
and its chosen course. Before this ideal situation comes to be, the 
EU alone can still play its important role in the accomplishment of 
the aforementioned first level task as regards the normalisation of 
Georgia-Russia relations. In other words, discharging the present 
critical situation and the restoration of the status of the first half of 
2006 is an achievable goal. The international community is doing 
much in this regard and the EU’s voice in this joint effort occupies 
a significant place. Statements of the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union as, likewise, the visit of the EU 
troika to Moscow made a difference with Russia sending its 
ambassador back to Georgia and, thus, making the first step 
towards relaxing the situation. This may not mean much by itself 
but the political temperature has obviously reached the necessary 
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level to “melt the ice.” As it seems now, the main emphasis in the 
EU’s short-term mediation will be on the restoration of the 2006 
status quo ante.  If this happens, it must not, however, be 
understood as an unconditional consent on the part of Russia. 
Moscow’s two principal objectives this year vis-à-vis Georgia are: 
1. getting Georgia’s consent on its WTO membership and             
2. leaving the formats of conflict resolution unchanged. Expectedly, 
the international community, the EU amongst it, may urge Georgia 
to agree with Russia’s requests. As for the second level task, which 
is associated with removing the two irritants in Georgia-Russia 
relations (Georgia’s integration into NATO and the unsettled 
conflicts), the EU is unable to accomplish it alone because of the 
aforementioned constraints. The EU will probably continue to 
include Georgian problems within a bilateral dialogue with Russia 
but this will not be a sufficient condition. The gist and tone of 
Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference show that 
the dialogue with Russia, on the further expansion of NATO, in 
particular, will become difficult.18  Accordingly, the prospects of 
Russia accommodating the course of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration will become more difficult and which will, in their turn, 
negatively affect the process of the normalisation of relations 
between the two countries.  It will also become a difficult task to 
persuade Russia to agree to any constructive action in the conflict 
zones.  Within this context, all of the above-described is becoming 
a serious challenge for the EU.  It would probably be better if the 
EU put the emphasis on overcoming the problems related to 
conflict resolution indirectly. In other words, instead of exhausting 
its resources in a diplomatic wrestle with Russia, it might be wiser 
if the EU focus on changing the logic of the circumstances around 
the conflicts.19 What is in mind is to support confidence building 
between Georgians and the residents of the conflict zones and to 
                                                 
18 A. Lievin, ‘The west must set a strategy for a resurgent Russia,’ Financial Times, 9 March 2007 
19 Dov Lynch, op.cit., p. 78. 
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develop the habit of co-operation amongst them. These efforts 
would unfreeze the process of conflict resolution from within and, 
thus, one of the major irritants in Georgia-Russia relations would 
be removed. The intention of Georgian authorities to engage in a 
direct dialogue with the parties of both conflicts, although 
somewhat delayed, is still the right decision. The EU can make a 
unique contribution in supporting this dialogue and in promoting 
the process of Euro-Atlantic integration in the conflict zones. The 
ground already exists for this type of activity to take place in these 
regions, particularly in Abkhazia where the reputation of the EU is 
higher than that of other Western institutions. Fortunately, there 
are positive first steps being taken in this direction which are also 
associated with the personal enthusiasm of a new EU Special 
Representative.  
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Georgia-Russia relations are 
one of the most complex in modern international affairs. This is 
an issue on whose resolution depend future contours of world 
order, at least in the post-Soviet area. Otherwise, the US or 
international organisations like the Council of Europe, the EU, the 
OSCE and the UN would not have been interested in resolving this 
crisis. The way Georgia-Russia relations will be regulated largely 
determines the future behaviour of Russia in the international 
arena. Today, as Russia reveals its ambition to introduce new 
rules of the game in international relations, serious challenges 
emerge for Georgia in the realisation of its chosen course. Under 
these circumstances, it is crucial that Georgia keep the chosen 
course but with more responsibility and care. Concerning the 
international community, including the EU, it can play an essential 
role in regulating relations between Georgia and Russia via well-
co-ordinated actions. The task is not a simple one as it requires 
the accurate identification of the role of the stakeholders based 
upon an equally accurate assessment of their potential.   

